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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 This matter comes on before this Court on a petition for 
review of two decisions and orders of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”).  Aguedita Odilia Ordonez-Tevalan 
(“Ordonez”) petitions for review of the BIA’s decision and 
order dismissing her appeal from a decision and order of an 
immigration judge (“IJ”) denying her applications for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”).  In addition, Julio Gonzalez Ordonez 
(“Gonzalez”), Ordonez’s youngest son, petitions for review of 
the BIA’s decision and order dismissing his appeal from the IJ’s 
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decision and order denying his derivative application for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. 
 While this petition was pending in this Court, petitioners 
and the Attorney General filed a joint motion with the BIA to 
reopen the BIA proceedings.  The BIA granted that motion and 
reissued its decisions and orders without change.  The 
petitioners did not file a petition for review in this Court of the 
reissued decisions and orders.  Thereafter the Attorney General 
filed a motion with this Court to dismiss the petition for review 
of the original decisions and orders for lack of jurisdiction.  We 
hold that because the reissued decisions and orders did not alter 
the prior decisions and orders that petitioners challenge in their 
petition, we have jurisdiction over their petition.  Therefore we 
will deny the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss the petitions 
on jurisdictional grounds.  We, however, will deny the petition 
for review on the merits.  
 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY 
 Ordonez is a native and citizen of Guatemala who has 
three sons.  Ordonez first entered the United States on March 
28, 2014, unaccompanied by her children and apparently 
without inspection, but on that day Border Patrol agents detained 
her.  She claims that during this detention she expressed fear of 
returning to Guatemala because of abuse she had suffered there. 
 Nevertheless, the Department of Homeland Security, after 
serving her with a Notice and Order of Expedited Removal, 
removed her on April 2, 2014.  But on June 1, 2014, within less 
than two months of her removal, Ordonez reentered the United 
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States with her youngest son, Gonzalez, who was then six years 
old, apparently again without inspection.  This entry also was 
not successful, as the Border Patrol detained her and Gonzalez 
on June 1, 2014.  In immigration court proceedings that 
followed, the IJ in his decision stated that, as Ordonez 
“explained it, she returned with [her son] because she was told 
that it was more likely that she would be released if she were to 
show up with a child[.]”  (AR 81).  Ordonez, however, left her 
other two sons in Guatemala with her parents.  Following 
Ordonez’s second detention, the Department of Homeland 
Security initiated proceedings against her to restore the prior 
order of removal, and served Gonzalez with a notice to appear in 
immigration court to answer the charge that he was removable 
under 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).   
 On September 25, 2014, while these removal proceedings 
were pending, Ordonez filed an application seeking asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT.1  
Gonzalez applied for similar relief as a derivative applicant on 
his mother’s application. 
 In the immigration court, Ordonez resisted removal and 
sought protective relief based on her alleged fear of abusive 
conduct by her former boyfriend, Jose Lopez, with whom she 
had a relationship from approximately 1998 to 2000.  Ordonez 
contended before the IJ that during that time frame, Lopez 
                                                 
1 According to the Attorney General’s brief, Ordonez did not 
actually seek asylum but she sought withholding of removal and 
CAT relief on a form that is also used when an alien is seeking 
asylum.  (Respondent’s br. at 6 n.4).  Nevertheless, inasmuch as 
the IJ and the BIA considered asylum, we address an asylum 
claim in this opinion. 
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subjected her to verbal, physical, and sexual abuse.  Ordonez 
testified in the immigration court that in April 2000, she ended 
her relationship with Lopez and thereafter she had no contact or 
communication with him until January 2014, when, apparently 
by chance, she encountered him.  Ordonez asserts that during 
this encounter, Lopez grabbed her on the street, kicked her, 
threw her to the ground, and attempted to rape her, but she 
managed to escape.  Ordonez claims that later in the same 
month, Lopez found her at her home and raped her.  She alleges 
that he threatened to kill her and any of her children who were 
with her if he saw her again.  As a result of these alleged actions 
and threats, Ordonez asserts that she stopped leaving her house 
alone and fled to this country to escape Lopez.     
 Following oral testimony and the filing of affidavits, an 
IJ on December 3, 2014, denied Ordonez’s claims for relief.  In 
his oral decision, the IJ first noted that Ordonez was placed only 
in withholding of removal proceedings in accordance with 8 
C.F.R. § 208.31(e) because she was ineligible for asylum due to 
the reinstatement of the prior order for her removal.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16.  In addressing the merits 
of the case, the IJ concluded that Ordonez was not credible 
given her vague recollections of dates, inconsistencies between 
her testimony and documentary evidence, and his belief that her 
testimony regarding the Border Patrol’s conduct during her first 
attempt to enter this country was “inconsistent with what the 
Court knows to be the practice of the Border Patrol.”  (AR 91).  
Accordingly, he rejected her application.  The IJ further 
determined that even if her testimony had been credible, she still 
failed to establish a basis for withholding of her removal.  
Finally, the IJ denied Ordonez relief on her CAT claim because 
he determined that there was no basis to find that any harm she 
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had suffered in Guatemala or would suffer if she returned to that 
country had been or would be inflicted or instigated by or with 
the consent, acquiescence, or willful blindness of any public 
official or person acting in an official capacity.     
 The IJ also determined that Gonzalez’s claims failed 
because of Ordonez’s lack of credibility.  The IJ found support 
for this outcome by observing that Gonzalez’s two older 
brothers continued to live in Guatemala without incident, a 
circumstance from which an inference could be drawn that he 
could safely return to that country.  Petitioners appealed to the 
BIA from the IJ’s decisions and orders.   
 On May 4, 2015, the BIA dismissed petitioners’ appeals. 
 In reaching its result, the BIA discerned “no clear error” in the 
IJ’s “consideration of the totality of the circumstances,” (AR 5), 
and concluded that the IJ “provided specific, cogent reasons for 
finding [Ordonez] not credible under section 208(b)(1)(B)(iii) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (‘INA’),” (AR 5).  
Moreover, the BIA concluded that Ordonez had “not presented 
independent evidence showing that a probability as opposed to a 
possibility of torture is more likely than not, by or with the 
consent or acquiescence (to include the concept of willful 
blindness) of an official of the Guatemalan government” if she 
returned to Guatemala.  (AR 5).  As a result, the BIA dismissed 
Ordonez’s appeal in its entirety.   
 In a separate decision and order, also issued on May 4, 
2015, the BIA dismissed Gonzalez’s appeal from the decision 
and order that the IJ had rendered with respect to him.  The BIA 
first referenced its affirmance of the IJ’s denial of Ordonez’s 
claims for asylum and withholding of removal due to her lack of 
credibility.  The BIA then noted that Gonzalez’s asylum 
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application was derivative to Ordonez’s and thus he did not have 
an independent claim for relief.  Accordingly, the BIA 
concluded that, in light of his mother’s ineligibility for relief, his 
claims, too, must fail.  Alternatively, the BIA noted that any 
threatened harm to Gonzalez, even if credible, would not be on 
account of any protected ground.  Further, the BIA highlighted 
the fact that the record did not reflect that Gonzalez suffered any 
harm before leaving Guatemala or that his two older brothers 
who remained in Guatemala suffered any harm either before or 
after their mother left Guatemala to come to this country.  
Finally, the BIA rejected Gonzalez’s CAT claim because the 
adverse credibility finding with respect to Ordonez entirely 
foreclosed his claims.   
 On May 13, 2015, petitioners filed a timely petition for 
review and a motion for a stay of removal in this Court.  On 
June 1, 2015, the Attorney General and petitioners filed a joint 
motion with the BIA to reopen the BIA proceedings because 
neither party had received the decision and order from the BIA 
that dismissed Gonzalez’s appeal.  On the same day, the 
Attorney General filed a motion to hold the proceedings on the 
petition for review in abeyance in light of the joint motion 
before the BIA to reopen the proceedings before the BIA.  The 
Attorney General argued that “[i]f the Board reopens 
proceedings, this Court will no longer have jurisdiction over the 
Board decision that is currently the subject of the petition for 
review filed in this case.”  (See Respondent’s Motion to Hold 
Proceedings in Abeyance, at 1 (June 1, 2015)).  Petitioners did 
not object to this request.   
  On July 14, 2015, the BIA entered an order in which it 
granted the joint motion to reopen the BIA proceedings.  
Specifically, the BIA stated that “[t]he record reflects that a 
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separate decision was prepared on behalf of [Gonzalez], but may 
not have been received by the parties.”  Respondent’s Response 
to Court Order and Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 3, at 3 (3d Cir. Aug. 
3, 2015).  Consequently, the BIA ordered that its prior decisions 
of May 4, 2015, with respect to both petitioners, be reissued and 
further determined that they “shall be treated as entered as of 
today’s date”—namely, July 14, 2015.  Id. 
 Petitioners filed an uncontested motion for a stay of 
removal and on August 3, 2015, we granted that motion and 
denied the Attorney General’s motion to hold the proceedings in 
abeyance as moot in light of the BIA’s July 14, 2015 reissuance 
of its May 4, 2015 decisions and orders.  We also asked the 
parties to comment on the purpose of the motion to reopen and 
the effect, if any, of the BIA’s reissuance of its earlier decisions 
and orders on this Court’s jurisdiction.   
 The Attorney General on August 3, 2015, filed a motion 
to dismiss the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.  In that 
submission, the Attorney General clarified that the purpose of 
the joint motion before the BIA was to allow the BIA to address 
Gonzalez’s claims, as the parties may not have recognized that it 
already had done so.  The Attorney General argued that, as a 
result of the BIA’s reissuance of its earlier decisions and orders, 
we lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition for review 
because the May 4, 2015 decisions and orders were no longer 
final.  The Attorney General also asserted that petitioners would 
have 30 days from the date of the reissuance of the decisions 
and orders, i.e., until August 13, 2015, to file a petition for 
review of the reissued decisions and orders.  But petitioners did 
not file a new petition for review within that time period or at 
any point thereafter.  Accordingly, we directed the parties to file 
supplemental letter memoranda to address the question of 
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whether we have jurisdiction. 
  Petitioners contended in response to our direction to 
comment on the question of the motion to reopen that the BIA 
reissued its May 4, 2015 decisions and orders on July 14, 2015, 
solely to cure an unintentionally incomplete record, and the 
reissuance of the May 4, 2015 decisions and orders, without 
change, did not render the initial petition for appellate review 
moot.  They asserted that, to the contrary, the reopening ripened 
the case so that the decisions and orders could be reissued and 
we could address their pending petition for review on the merits. 
 The Attorney General, however, argued that the BIA’s original 
decisions and orders were no longer final, as they had been 
vacated and replaced by the new decisions and orders and 
therefore we do not have jurisdiction over the petition for review 
of the original decisions and orders.  The Attorney General also 
pointed out that “[p]etitioners had ample opportunity to file new 
petitions for review after the newly issued decisions[,]” 
particularly inasmuch as the Attorney General’s motion to 
dismiss, filed on August 3, 2015, “specifically alerted the parties 
to the necessity of filing new petitions for review” on or before 
August 13, 2015.  (See Respondent’s Letter Memorandum in 
Response to the Court’s Feb. 2, 2016 Order, at 3 (Feb. 9, 2016)). 
 
III.  STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD 
OF REVIEW 
 The BIA had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 8 
C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(2) and 1240.15.  We discuss our 
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), INA § 242(a), at length 
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below and ultimately conclude that we have jurisdiction.2  On 
the merits, we “decide the petition only on the administrative 
record on which the order[s] of removal [were] based,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(4)(A), and “the administrative findings of fact are 
conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(b)(4)(B). 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Jurisdiction 
 An order of removal may be reviewed only when “[t]he 
petition for review [is] filed not later than 30 days after the date 
of the final order of removal.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (emphasis 
added).  Though the petition for review was timely, we are left 
with the jurisdictional issue of whether the BIA’s grant of a 
motion to reopen proceedings, which resulted in the reissuance 
of previous decisions and orders without change, divested us of 
jurisdiction to hear the merits of the petition for review from the 
original decisions and orders.  We conclude that it does not. 
 In Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 115 S.Ct. 1537 (1995), the 
Supreme Court interpreted the consolidation provision of 8 
U.S.C. § 1252,3 which currently reads as follows:  “When a 
                                                 
2 Venue is properly in this Court because the IJ completed the 
proceedings in York, Pennsylvania. 
 
3 When the Supreme Court decided Stone, the consolidation 
provision was codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(6) and contained 
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petitioner seeks review of an order under this section, any 
review sought of a motion to reopen or reconsider the order shall 
be consolidated with the review of the order.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1252(b)(6).  The issue before the Court in Stone was whether 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit correctly concluded 
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a petition for review of a 
deportation order then pending before it, the specific question 
being “whether the filing of a timely motion for reconsideration 
of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals tolls the 
[time] period for seeking judicial review of the decision.”  
Stone, 514 U.S. at 388, 115 S.Ct. at 1541.   
 Stone dealt with an adverse deportation decision and 
order that the BIA made with respect to the petitioner, Marvin 
Stone, on July 26, 1991.  Id. at 389, 115 S.Ct. at 1541.  Without 
then filing a petition for review, Stone filed a timely “motion to 
reopen and/or reconsider” the July 26, 1991 decision and order 
with the BIA in August 1991.  Id.  On February 3, 1992—“some 
17 months later”—the BIA denied the motion as frivolous.  Id.  
Thereafter, Stone petitioned the court of appeals for review of 
both the July 26, 1991 deportation order and the February 3, 
1992 denial of his motion to reopen or reconsider.  Id.  On a 
simple counting of days, the petition was timely as to the 
February 1992 order, but untimely as to the July 1991 
deportation order.  See id.  The court of appeals held that it did 
                                                                                                             
wording that is slightly different from its current form.  But the 
wording of the prior and current consolidation provisions is not 
different in substance.  See Stone, 514 U.S. at 393-94, 115 S.Ct. 
at 1543 (setting forth the then-controlling provision); Thomas v. 
Att’y Gen., 625 F.3d 134, 139 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing 
Stone and providing an annotated comparison of current § 
1252(b)(6) with the previous § 1105a(a)(6)).   
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not have jurisdiction to review the July 26, 1991 deportation 
order, though it could review the February 3, 1992 order 
denying the motion to reopen.  The issue in the Supreme Court, 
then, was whether the filing of the motion to reopen and/or for 
reconsideration tolled the time within which Stone could file a 
petition for review of the July 26, 1991 deportation order, or, 
alternatively, whether Stone’s petition for review was out of 
time with respect to that order so that the court of appeals 
correctly dismissed it.  See id. 
 Turning to the consolidation provision, the Court 
concluded that “[b]y its terms, [it] contemplates two petitions 
for review and directs the courts to consolidate the matters.”  Id. 
at 394, 115 S.Ct. at 1543.  The Court elaborated: 
The words of the statute do not 
permit us to say that the filing of a 
petition for reconsideration or 
reopening dislodges the earlier 
proceeding reviewing the 
underlying order.  The statute, in 
fact, directs that the motion to 
reopen or reconsider is to be 
consolidated with the review of the 
order, not the other way around. 
This indicates to us that the action 
to review the underlying order 
remains active and pending before 
the court.  We conclude that the 
statute is best understood as 
reflecting an intent on the part of 
Congress that deportation orders 
are to be reviewed in a timely 
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fashion after issuance, irrespective 
of the later filing of a motion to 
reopen or reconsider. 
Id. at 394, 115 S.Ct. at 1543-44.   
 Stone established that the initial BIA decision is “final 
when issued, irrespective of the later filing of a reconsideration 
motion, and the aggrieved party would seek judicial review of 
the order within the specified period.  Upon denial of 
reconsideration, the petitioner would file a separate petition to 
review that second final order.”  Id. at 395, 115 S.Ct. at 1544; 
accord id. at 405, 115 S.Ct. at 1549 (“The consolidation 
provision . . . reflects Congress’ understanding that a deportation 
order is final, and reviewable, when issued.  Its finality is not 
affected by the subsequent filing of a motion to reconsider.”).  
Stone dealt with a scenario in which the petitioner did not file 
his petition from the initial BIA order but rather filed his 
petition after the BIA denied his motion for reopening or 
reconsideration.  Consequently, the court of appeals correctly 
did not review the deportation order.   
 Though Thomas v. Attorney General, 625 F.3d 134 (3d 
Cir. 2010), differed factually from Stone, we followed Stone in 
that case.  In Thomas, we dealt with a scenario in which an 
applicant filed a petition for review from an initial BIA decision 
and order simultaneously with the filing of a motion with the 
BIA to reconsider its prior decision and order.4  The 
                                                 
4 In a comparable situation, a district court would not have 
jurisdiction to entertain a motion for reconsideration once an 
appeal had been taken unless the court of appeals remanded the 
case to that court.  See Venen v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 117, 120 (3d 
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jurisdictional question in that case arose because the applicant 
did not file a second petition for review after the BIA granted 
the motion to reconsider  and issued a new decision altering its 
recitation of several pertinent facts, but adhering “to the legal 
analysis set forth in its initial decision.”  Id. at 136.  We 
concluded in Thomas that, in light of Stone, we retained 
jurisdiction over the initial petition for review. 
 While Thomas began its analysis with reliance on Stone 
for the proposition that the initial BIA order was “final” for 
purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1252, it proceeded to note that “[t]he 
finality of an order . . . is not the only requirement that must 
exist before we may exercise jurisdiction.”  Thomas, 625 F.3d at 
139 (citing Jaggernauth v. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 1346, 1351 
(11th Cir. 2005)).  We explained that we must also look to the 
constitutional “case-or-controversy requirement,” which “‘limits 
the business of federal courts to questions presented in an 
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable 
of resolution through the judicial process[.]’”  Id. (alteration in 
original) (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S. 
Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 
1208 (1980)).  “When the questions or issues presented are no 
longer ‘live,’ the case is moot.  That is, an issue is moot if 
changes in circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of the 
litigation have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.”  
Id. at 139-40 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 Applying these justiciability principles to the facts then at 
hand, we acknowledged in Thomas that the BIA’s subsequent 
                                                                                                             
Cir. 1983).  But there is no doubt that the BIA could reconsider 
its decisions and orders in this case without a remand from the 
Court.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. 
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grant of the motion for reconsideration constituted a change in 
circumstances.  Id. at 140.  Nevertheless, we clarified that “[t]he 
BIA’s mere grant of a motion for reconsideration . . . does not in 
itself render the petition for review moot.”  Id.  “Rather, it is the 
substance of the BIA’s subsequent decision, upon 
reconsideration, that determines whether there is still a live issue 
for the court of appeals to resolve.”  Id.  We provided the 
following criterion to determine appealability when there are 
successive BIA decisions and orders: 
[I]f the BIA’s subsequent decision 
substantively altered the ratio 
decidendi in its earlier disposition 
and operated to vacate the BIA’s 
earlier decision, then the petition 
for review of the earlier decision is 
without effect because there is no 
longer any order or decision for the 
court of appeals to review.  On the 
other hand, if the BIA’s subsequent 
decision did not materially alter the 
rationale of the earlier ruling, that 
ruling remains effective and subject 
to judicial review by the court of 
appeals. 
Id.   
 Based on this analysis, we held in Thomas that we 
retained jurisdiction over the initial petition for review, because 
the BIA’s decision following its grant of the motion for 
reconsideration “adhered to its earlier legal analysis” and 
differed only in its correction of specific factual errors.  Id. at 
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141.  Our decision in Thomas was, and remains, consistent with 
the reasoning of the majority of courts of appeals to address this 
jurisdictional question.  See, e.g., Espinal v. Holder, 636 F.3d 
703, 705-06 (5th Cir. 2011); Plasencia-Ayala v. Mukasey, 516 
F.3d 738, 745 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by 
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 
2009) (en banc); Jaggernauth, 432 F.3d at 1350-52; Khouzam v. 
Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 167 (2d Cir. 2004).  But see Bronisz v. 
Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he grant of a 
motion to reopen vacates the previous order of deportation or 
removal and reinstates the previously terminated immigration 
proceedings.”). 
 While Thomas involved a motion for reconsideration and 
thus in itself does not resolve the issue before us, we hold that 
its framework applies equally to a motion to reopen, particularly 
where, as here, the parties sought the reopening simply so that 
the BIA could reissue earlier decisions and orders.  Inasmuch as 
the BIA’s reissuance of its initial decisions and orders in this 
case did not change its initial decisions and orders from which 
petitioners already had sought review, we retain jurisdiction to 
address the petitioners’ petition for review.  Consequently, the 
Attorney General’s motion to dismiss will be denied, and we 
will proceed to the merits of the petition for review. 
B.  Merits 
 We recognize that removal cases frequently raise 
sensitive issues as it is no small thing to require an alien who 
may face adverse or even desperate circumstances in her home 
country to return there.  Nevertheless, there are statutes and 
regulations governing removal cases and our consideration of 
these binding standards and the record in this case makes clear 
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that the petition for review in this case is not meritorious.  In 
reaching this conclusion we limit our review of the merits to the 
administrative record on which the orders of removal were 
based.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A).  Inasmuch as the BIA adopted 
and affirmed the IJ’s decisions and orders as well as making an 
independent analysis, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s 
decisions and orders.  See Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 612-
13 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 The BIA’s factual findings are “conclusive unless any 
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude 
otherwise.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  This deferential standard 
applies equally to credibility determinations.  Chen v. Ashcroft, 
376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[W]e are required to sustain 
an adverse credibility determination unless . . . no reasonable 
person would have found the applicant incredible.” (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)).  
Critically, “[w]e look at an adverse credibility determination to 
ensure that it was based on inconsistent statements, 
contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable testimony.”  
Toure v. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 325 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation 
omitted).   
 It is often the case that a petitioner will seek relief 
through the grant of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 
under the CAT.  A petitioner has the burden to demonstrate her 
eligibility for asylum, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a), and, to satisfy that 
burden, she must prove that she is a refugee.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(b).  A “refugee” is a person outside her country of 
nationality who is “unable or unwilling” to return to that country 
“because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).  
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Ordonez’s claim for asylum, however, cannot possibly be 
successful because she is not eligible for asylum as she entered 
the country illegally after being removed.  8 U.S.C. § 
1231(a)(5). 
 Nevertheless Ordonez may seek and, if justified, obtain 
an order for withholding of removal as she is not categorically 
precluded from obtaining that relief.  To demonstrate her 
qualification for withholding of removal, “an alien must show 
that if returned to [her] country, it is more likely than not that 
[her] life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.”  Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 726 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).  “To meet this standard, [an alien] 
must show with objective evidence that it is ‘more likely than 
not’ [that she] will face persecution if [she] is deported” to her 
home country.  Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1066 (3d Cir. 
1997) (citation omitted).  “‘[P]ersecution’ is an extreme concept 
that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards 
as offensive.”  Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 Finally, to receive protection under the CAT, an alien 
must prove that “it is more likely than not that . . . she would be 
tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.”  8 
C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).  Torture is “an extreme form of cruel 
and inhuman treatment,” id. § 1208.18(a)(2), “inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity,” id. § 
1208.18(a)(1).  Using the deferential standards that we set forth 
above, we turn to petitioners’ claims for relief from removal.   
 We note at the outset of our merits analysis that there is 
substantial evidence to support the adverse credibility 
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determination with respect to Ordonez’s testimony because the 
administrative record demonstrates “inconsistent statements, 
contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable testimony,” 
all of which support the IJ’s and the BIA’s conclusions on the 
credibility issue.  Toure, 443 F.3d at 325.  First, Ordonez 
submitted affidavits from two individuals she contends had 
knowledge of the abuse she endured in Guatemala at the hands 
of Lopez.  Jorge Tevalan Puac (“Puac”), who is identified as the 
First Auxiliary Mayor of the Village Aldea Felicidad, was one 
such affiant.  His affidavit states that he reviewed the records of 
the auxiliatura, which reflect that Ordonez complained to the 
local authorities in the village on June 6, 2014, to state that she 
was the victim of domestic violence.  When asked about this 
affidavit, Ordonez identified Puac as a neighbor, not a 
government official.  Moreover, Ordonez was asked why the 
Puac affidavit stated that she complained about the domestic 
violence on June 6, 2014, when, in fact, she was in the custody 
of immigration officials in this country on that date.  She had no 
explanation for this discrepancy.   
 The second affiant was Estaban Vail (“Vail”), who is 
identified as the Community Mayor of the Village of Nueva 
Cajola.  In his affidavit, Vail states that Ordonez was a victim of 
domestic violence during her married life.  When asked about 
this affidavit, Ordonez stated that Vail was another neighbor 
who worked as a farmer.  Ordonez was asked about the specific 
reference to “married life” and conceded that no one in the 
village knew about her prior relationship with Lopez.  Rather, 
they were aware of her marriage to the father of her children, 
Magdaleno Gonzalez de Belan, and she does not claim that he 
abused her.  As was the case with respect to the Puac affidavit, 
Ordonez could not explain the discrepancy in this affidavit.  As 
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a result of these affidavits, both of which appear to have been 
submitted from two local mayors in Guatemala, Ordonez was 
asked whether she knows anyone who works in government.  
She replied that she did not, even when questioned directly 
about the titles provided on the Puac and Vail affidavits.  It was 
only after direct, repeated questioning that Ordonez 
acknowledged that Puac and Vail held local governmental 
positions.  These inconsistencies between Ordonez’s testimony 
and the documentary evidence she submitted provide sufficient 
evidence to support the IJ’s credibility determination.   
 Finally, Ordonez is not entitled to protection under the 
CAT because there is no evidence in the record that she was 
subjected to abuse “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with 
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).  To the 
contrary, both Ordonez’s testimony and the affidavits submitted 
on her behalf indicate that the local government and other 
members of her community did not condone any abuse and, in 
fact, offered her assistance.  Based on the record before us, we 
are constrained to accept the adverse credibility determination 
and conclude that the IJ and the BIA properly denied Ordonez’s 
requests for withholding of removal and protection under the 
CAT.  Thus, as Ordonez also is barred from obtaining asylum 
she cannot obtain relief in these proceedings. 
 The IJ and the BIA likewise correctly denied Gonzalez’s 
claims.  His alleged entitlement to relief is entirely reliant on his 
mother’s claimed fear of persecution.  Because the adverse 
credibility determination with respect to her makes her claims 
unsustainable, so, too, does it prevent Gonzalez from 
establishing his claims.  Moreover, even if Ordonez had been 
credible, Gonzalez, like his mother, has failed to identify his 
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membership in a cognizable social group, a requirement for both 
his asylum claim and his request for withholding of removal.5  
See Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 726.  Ordonez’s testimony makes clear 
that the only threat that Lopez allegedly made to her children 
was to harm them if they were with her when he harmed her.  
Thus, the evidence does not support the claim that Gonzalez 
cannot return to Guatemala “because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).  Consequently, the IJ 
correctly denied his application for asylum and withholding of 
removal, and the BIA correctly dismissed his appeal from that 
disposition.   
 Finally, Gonzalez’s claim for protection under the CAT 
also fails because there is no evidence that it is “more likely than 
not” that he would be “tortured” if returned to Guatemala.  
Rather, the record demonstrates that the local government 
officials do not condone domestic violence and that his older 
brothers remain in Guatemala unharmed.  Accordingly, the IJ 
and the BIA properly determined that he is not entitled to 
protection under the CAT. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
                                                 
5 The BIA indicated that inasmuch as Gonzalez “is a derivative 
asylum applicant, he does not have a claim for asylum 
independent from his mother’s claim.”  (AR 463).  We are not 
suggesting that a minor child pursuing a derivative application 
based on his parent’s application must himself be a member of a 
protected cognizable social group if his parent is a member of a 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the Attorney 
General’s motion to dismiss the petition for review for lack of 
jurisdiction and will deny the petition for review filed on behalf 
of petitioners on the merits.  Any order outstanding for stay of 
removal of either petitioner will be vacated.   
 
 
 
